Abstract. In this paper we seek to exploit some of the insights of a strategic^relational approach in examining the response of business interests to the newly devolved and regionalised governance context in Britain. In the analysis, the focus is directed particularly at the changing context within which business politics operates in the British regions and, importantly, on the perceptions of business actors and interests of their position in these changing contexts. In this way, we seek to move beyond established structuralist and agency-oriented approaches to business interest representation, which have tended to underplay the influence and complexity of business perceptions in exploring the changing form of business representation. Subsequently, we present some further brief comments on the respective capacities of groups and organisations representing business, and the strategic processes that underlie business responses to the new governance arrangements, which will be important to the further development of analysis founded in the strategic^relational approach. In broad terms, we argue that business perceptions of the devolutionary context have underscored a limited restructuring of business interest representation in Britain, as business groups register the ongoing centralism that characterises the British polity. In addition, the organisation of business interest representation displays a strong path dependency, reflecting a degree of institutional stasis and the strength of perceived structures in this sphere. However, a series of relatively modest changes are underway as a variety of business interests adopt particular kinds of strategies given their specific aims and capacities.
the structures confronting them in selecting their courses of action. In addition, agents might also examine their own nature and capacities and alter their own identities in light of their understanding of the structural context. In turn, agents can influence structures, but their capacities to do so are unequal, given the`strategically selective' nature of structures that operate to reinforce some actions and discourage others. In general, then, the SRA seeks to``examine structure in relation to action and action in relation to structure, rather than bracketing one of them'' (Jessop, 2001 (Jessop, , page 1223 .
In our view, this promises significant theoretical advantages over the structuralist and methodologically individualist approaches that have been prominent in analyses of subnational business interest representation in Britain. On the one hand it militates against structuralist accounts that, in their most trenchant versions, effectively discount collective business representation, arguing that the structural power of capital is articulated primarily at the level of the state and the individual capital unit (Offe, 1985; Offe and Wiesenthal, 1985 ; see also Peck, 1995) . However, as Peck (1995, page 19 , emphasis in original) argues,``collective business organisations do exist, do intervene in the political process, do have effects. This requires explanation.'' Peck's response here (pace Jessop, 1983; 1990) is to move to a less abstract reading of institutional change in the particular political and institutional context of Thatcherism. Thus the wider incorporation of business interests is intimately related to the neoliberal accumulation strategy and hegemonic project of Thatcherism, with particular implications for a variety of business interests and organisations. Yet, in our view, this retains an undue emphasis on structural conditions. For example, in examining the changing place of business elites under Thatcherism, Peck argues that``business interests are currently being mobilized, given their form and presented with their function by the state'' (1995, page 17, emphasis in original). As we have argued elsewhere (Wood et al, 1998) , this understanding of business mobilisation as essentially the central state's ideological and institutional constitution of a probusiness agenda tends to underplay questions of agency, and, in particular, the strategic responses of specific business interests and organisations to the changed context presented by Thatcherite neoliberalism.
In contrast, some of the most influential work examining subnational business representation generally, and notably at regional scales, has adopted a methodologically individualist stance based in a framework of rational choice. At the regional scale this has been informed predominantly by the formative analysis of Schmitter and Streeck (1981;  see also chapters in Coleman and Jacek, 1989) , who examined the question of business association, initially at sectoral and national levels, as a process of rational choice on the part of individual capitalists within the constraints of previous organisational forms, state policies and available resources. This posited a choice for business interest associations between two potentially contradictory logics of`membership' and`influence', with the outcome representing a compromise between more fragmented organisational forms, or more comprehensive and unitary structures (Schmitter and Lanzalaco, 1989, page 206) . A more fragmented organisation might, for example, be appropriate for managing membership issues, whereas a more unitary structure might be more effective for exerting political influence. These theoretical foundations were subsequently adapted to approach the question of territoriality (in particular, see Coleman and Jacek, 1989) , and a further set of organisational`logics' were introduced relating to the formation of business association objectives, on the one hand, and their effective implementation, on the other (Streeck, 1989, pages 61^62) .
More generally, as Raco (2003) describes, approaches based in rational choice seek to explain business representation through the costs and benefits to individual businesses in making rational, self-interested choices based in part on``the market conditions prevailing on the individual business and the sector of which it is a part'' (Bennett, 1999 , page 878).
In turn, the focus is directed at the internal characteristics of associations, their voluntary members and the choices that they make, and the collective agendas that represent the sum of their individual preferences. However, we would argue that these approaches based on internal organisational logics and individual choices and associated organisational agendas substantially underplay the diversity of business subjectivities and the relationships between business interests and the state that are critical to the form and character of business representation (see also Raco, 2003) .
Adopting an SRA to business interest representation implies asking different questions and operating at a different level of abstraction from established approaches. Rather than seeing business interest representation as an expression of the structural characteristics of capitalist society, for example, or reducing it to the rational calculation of individual agents, the SRA examines the interaction of a strategically selective context that privileges certain forms of interests and activities and strategic actors who continually examine the options open to them in pursuing their various interests. In this sense, the focus is less on abstract theorising and more on the immediate concerns of specific structural and discursive constraints, together with the strategic calculation, action, and learning of individual actors and organisations. In other words, as Hay and Richards (2000, page 14) suggest,``we need to understand what are the determining factors behind an individual or organisational selection of one particular option over another. '' In the case of devolution in Britain, business interests have at times sought explicitly to influence the evolution and character of devolutionary arrangements and the associated institutional and governance forms and, within this context, to formulate and deploy strategies in support of their various aims and objectives. It is in an understanding of this explicit strategic activity, the often disguised and hidden meanings that operate around these actions, and the rationalities that underscore such strategies, that a strategic^relational approach provides the key to explaining business politics in this sphere (see also Hay and Jessop, 1995, page 3) . Use of this approach to explain business politics in the devolutionary context in Britain therefore implies a consideration of several questions. These include an examination of (1) the nature of the British state and business politics in Britain and how this context is changing; (2) the perceptions of business actors and organisations of this context and how these perceptions arise and change; (3) the relative capacities of business interests and actors; (4) the processes through which business actors formulate and advance their strategies in the face of change; and (5) the processes of monitoring, adjustment, and learning that business interests undertake (compare Hay and Jessop, 1995, page 15) . In this paper, we focus particularly on the first two aspects to establish the changing context within which business representation operates in Britain and the perceptions of business interests of this changing context, including with regard to devolution. (2) In this way we seek to interrogate the influence and complex nature of business perceptions in explaining the changing form of business representation, a theoretical concern that has been significantly underplayed across the various strands of the literature to date. In our view, such a framework holds significant promise for explaining the concrete experience of regional business associations in Britain and for approaching the dynamics of business interest organisation in a context of constitutional change. 2 Business politics and the UK state: continuity and change Adopting an SRA to explain business responses to devolution in Britain implies a sensitivity to history and path dependency. As Hay (2002, pages 129^130) describes:`a lthough, in the final analysis, social and political outcomes are contingent upon strategic choices, the context itself presents an unevenly contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for certain outcomes while militating against others. Over time such strategic selectivity will throw up a series of systematically structured outcomes ... . Consequently, while the outcome of any particular strategic intervention is unpredictable, the distribution of outcomes over a longer time frame will exhibit a characteristic regularity.'' Examining the response of business interests to devolution thereby implies an assessment of the historical evolution of business interests and their relationship with the state to identify the context within which business politics operates and the patterns of strategic selectivity in operation. As Grant (1993, page 105) , Lange (1998) , and May et al (1998) amongst others have argued, business association in Britain tends to be characterised by rather static organisational structures and strong institutional and political influences that often reinforce the status quo. Writing in 1983, Grant argued, for example, that:`T he most striking fact about the business lobby in Britain is the lack of change in the last 20 years in its organisation and methods of lobbying. The last major change in the business lobby was the formation of the CBI [Confederation of British Industry] from its three predecessor organisations in 1965. There have been more subtle, long-run changes, such as the growth of government relations departments in large firms; the decline in the importance of employers organisations as collective bargaining units as multi-employer bargaining has become less significant; and a growing formalisation in the representational arrangements of the City of London. However, the comprehensive recommendations made by the Devlin Commission in 1972 for the reform of the system of business representation had little practical effect'' (page 166). Clearly, this is not to argue that business politics and the framework for business representation in Britain is unchanging. Indeed, as Grant has argued (1983, page 178) , the postwar era has witnessed a greater formalisation of business interest representation, with the formation of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and with the expansion of direct relationships between individual large firms and central government, as the old`establishment' relations of the 1950s gradually disappeared. Yet it is also apparent that throughout the postwar period, and beyond that into the later stages of Thatcherism and the current New Labour administration, substantial changes in the nature of the British state and in patterns of economic organisation have been associated with significant continuities in the system of business association and in the character of business politics. Indeed, business representation in Britain would seem to be marked by a pattern of``long drawn-out historical development'' and a``considerable amount of inertia'' (Grant, 1993, page 105) . The reasons for this are not fully clear at present and would warrant further detailed research. However, Grant suggests a number of contributory factors: the difficulties of organisational change (1983, page 178) , the`defensive' and`protective' character of many business interest associations (BIAs) (page 165), the lack of effective and sustained pressures for rationalisation from government, the civil service or large firms (pages 169^171), the system of collective bargaining in Britain (page 171), and, often, the scepticism of BIA members (page 171). In the face of such stasis the predominantly fragmented character of business interest representation in Britain has been substantially maintained (pages 169^170). D Valler, A Wood The relative inertia in the system of business representation in Britain is referenced by a number of long-standing characteristic features that are of particular relevance in explaining business responses to devolution and regionalisation. First, we might note the overwhelming centralism of business politics in Britain (for example, see Adams et al, 2002, pages 212^213) . In the context of a highly centralised unitary state, economic and political power has historically been overwhelmingly concentrated in London. In turn, as Gamble argues (2000, page 303),``the interest group universe in the UK polity was traditionally centred on the central state'' and, despite recent domestic developments and the emergence of a multilevel polity,``the national level remains the most developed in the UK polity and the most important for understanding policy agendas'' (pages 298^299).
The system of business interest representation in Britain has largely paralleled the centralisation of economic, political, and state structures. Indeed, in general, it would appear that the structure of business political representation probably provides a good indicator of the effective distribution of power in a country, and in Britain this has adopted a particularly centralised form. It is perhaps instructive, therefore, that the geography of business politics in Britain has warranted relatively little attention in academic and policy circles.
As Grant (1989, page 10) suggests, it would appear that the pattern of business interests and associations in Britain has been shaped largely by the structure of the British state. This operates predominantly through the indirect impact of government structures rather than through any direct state intervention to organise business association. Attempts on the part of central government to rationalise the pattern of business associations, for example, have been sporadic and largely unsuccessful, particularly given the voluntary nature of organisations representing business in Britain. Hence,`T he state does not pursue some organisational grand design in relation to business associations; rather the actions of government constitute an`invisible hand' which guides and shapes (but certainly does not determine) the way which business associations are organised'' (Grant, 1993, page 109) . In this sense, the centralism that characterises the political organisation of business in Britain reflects an organic and long-term process of development that mirrors the historical centralism of the British state.
A second characteristic, hinted at in the above discussion, is the predominantly reactive character of British business interests. As Grant suggests (1983, page 180),``British business associations are more attuned to reacting to initiatives taken by government than taking initiatives themselves.'' This has been referenced not least in previous devolution episodes, as Lynch (1998) demonstrates in the case of Scotland in the early and late 1970s. More recently, Scottish business organisations, in contrast to a range of other interests, were not involved in the Scottish Constitutional Convention from 1989 to 1995 and therefore had``little direct influence on the current devolution proposals'' (Lynch, 1998, page 89) . Overall, it is clear that business groups in Scotland have generally lacked a positive agenda over the devolution issue and, in turn,``business responses to devolution were therefore almost completely reactive and somewhat unimaginative'' (Lynch, 1998, page 101) .
Allied to this reactive stance is a clear perception on the part of various business interests in Scotland of their limited role in debates over constitutional change. In many respects this reflects the nature of the devolution debate as seen by businessöthat the constitutional question per se is largely outside of the remit of business interests, and that business groups should not become too closely involved beyond explicitly`businessrelated' issues such as taxation, business rates, and policy on inward investment. The devolution issue has been viewed as essentially a question of democracy and popular representation and, in this context, devolution has been increasingly viewed by business as inevitable given the scale of public support in Scotland. Consequently, political neutrality has often seemed the most astute stance for business interests in order to avoid alienating prodevolution interests and to secure workable relations with the newly devolved institutions (for further discussion, see Lynch, 1998) Scottish business interests have thus been faced with the task of responding to a context set largely by the state and the electorate. Although a variety of business groups have raised specific issues and concerns at various stages of the devolution debate, the predominant attitude has been one of pragmatism in the face of increasingly inevitable change. Business groups sought to maintain contact and exert influence rather than to engage in open conflict and recognised that they would need to work with the new institutions across a wide range of policy fields.
In addition, business politics in Britain has been marked by the comparative underdevelopment of corporatist arrangements. Despite the emergence of Keynesian interventionism in the postwar period, the British political economy has been characterised by an underlying liberalism and commitment to the free market that has militated against close relations between state actors and business (Smith, 1993, page 157) . Corporatist arrangements were thus relatively underdeveloped in Britain in part because of the weakness of the state in this sphere and its tendencies towards short-termism in the emerging Fordist crisis. As Jessop (1992, page 20) has argued, the British state was`flawed', with limited strategic capacities and a resultant tendency to oscillate between, on the one hand, various forms of interventionism within an overall commitment to demand management and welfarism and, on the other hand, a liberal commitment to the free market and a more limited state role (Jessop, 1992 , page 21). The result was policy failure and an economy noted for:`m arket forces prone to market failures rather than spontaneous self-expansion, corporatist strategies without the corporatist structures needed to sustain them, and state intervention without an interventionist state able to steer an open economy dominated by monopoly capital'' (Jessop, 1992, page 22) . However, this also reflects the nature of capitalist interests in Britain, which have been institutionally weak (compare Grant, 1993 : pages 18^20; for further discussion; see Valler et al, 2004) . This is registered in a number of ways. First, BIAs are fragmented and divided along several planes öcharacteristics that are not transcended by the key representative bodies, which tend to be looser`umbrella' arrangements rather thaǹ peak' organisations with definite hierarchies of membership and policymaking. Second, BIAs in Britain have lacked the financial, organisational, personnel, and political resources that derive from the public law status and obligatory membership arrangements found in other European contexts. Third, the CBI, as the`leading' BIA in Britain, has been hamstrung by the breadth of its membership, an elaborate committee structure, and a tendency to aim policies at the lowest common denominator. In addition, it has been unable to mediate effectively between the interests of finance and multinational capital, on the one hand, and industrial capital, on the other, and has thereby effectively reproduced the political hegemony of the former to the detriment of the latter (Leys, 1983, page 110) . Fourth, as we have seen, the leading BIAs have tended to exhibit a degree of inertia and a predominantly reactive character, rather than any clear capacity for strategy making and delivery (for associated discussion, see Grant, 1993, pages 104^111) .
Subsequently, the nature of the state and state^business relations was radically altered through the political^economic strategy of Thatcherism, which incorporated major changes in the`representational regime'. Here,``the ways in which organised interests are articulated in and through the state'' (Bertramsen, 1991 , page 119; see also Jones, 1999 , pages 63^65) were changed, in part through the courting of individual entrepreneurial business leaders as the vanguard of Thatcherite neoliberalism, in place of more formalised, bureaucratic, and slow-moving business organisations. This effectively ended what limited engagement there had been with corporatism in Britain and, as Peck (1995, page 23) describes, by the end of the Thatcher decade the last vestiges of macroeconomic corporatist machinery had been effectively dismantled. In terms of business associations, the position of the CBI in particular was substantially undermined, given its perceived association with the failures of corporatism and as the mouthpiece of`business in general', including large sections of failing industrial capital. In place of organised business representation, then, Thatcherism was associated with alternative moves to engage specific types of business interests in new ways, and new bipartite partnership arrangements were introduced at the meso (sectoral or local) and micro (firm or enterprise) levels to incorporate business interests into the Thatcherite project on individual and local bases (see Peck, 1995) .
Since 1997 the Labour government has established rather more conciliatory relations with the CBI and other organisations representing business. Although it is clear that Labour has been committed to a liberated business sector as the key to national competitiveness, and in turn has largely sustained the noninterventionist and deregulatory stances of previous Conservative administrations (Glyn and Wood, 2001 , page 63), there has also been a recognition of the need for practical coordination and agreement between a range of social actors in responding to the challenges of globalisation. Partnership has been a dominant discourse under New Labour and, given Prime Minister Blair's continual emphasis on the party's probusiness agenda, business groups have been identified as a crucial voice to be heard within the`big tent'. Yet this is in no way to signify the rise or reemergence of corporatist arrangements. As Taylor (2001, page 258) points out:`M r Blair was not prepared to revive forms of institutional tripartism that could bring together the TUC [Trades Union Congress], the CBI, other business organisations and non-governmental bodies in self-standing new independent public bodies. In every other European Union country social dialogues and social pacts as well as macro-economic national economic policy co-ordination are commonplace, reflecting the continuing important role being played by trade unions and employer associations in the successful management of their political economies. But in Britain such ideas have found little favour with Mr Blair.'' To summarise, then, the relative inertia in business interest representation in Britain suggests strong and well-established patterns of strategic selectivity, not least with regard to the overwhelming centralism that historically has been such a key feature of business politics in this case. It would appear that the context of state^business relations in Britain has effectively`selected for' centralism in business politics and, from a strategic^relational viewpoint, we might anticipate that such an outcome would be likely to continue. Certainly, the current devolutionary process has not incorporated the sort of radical restructuring of state structures and functions that might in turn have prompted a major reaction in the organisation of business interest representation in Britain. Indeed, devolution was never aimed at divesting key central state macroeconomic management or regulatory activities, and there has been no indication of substantial increased support for corporatist or tripartite relations in recent years. Hence an applied strategic^relational approach would suggest the likelihood of a significant degree of continuity in this sphere.
3 Devolution, regionalisation, and business politics: business perceptions Historically, various business interests in Britain have tended to view devolution as something of a threat. This reflected a number of concerns, including the need to protect the UK single market, the perceived dangers of left-wing Labour administrations in Scotland and Wales, potentially high levels of public expenditure in the devolved territories, the costs of the devolution process and subsequent structures, potential organisational inefficiencies such as the duplication of state activities, and the possibilities of the creeping extension of devolved powers as part of a shift towards independence. In turn, it would be fair to say that business interests have tended towards a general scepticism over devolution and have, on occasion, adopted a clear oppositional stance, though, as Lynch (1998) has demonstrated, this has not been as vociferous or consolidated as media representations might have suggested. Yet what is clearly apparent is that the arrival of the Labour government in 1997 convinced many business interests and organisations across Britain that devolution was inevitable, and business strategies altered in response to this. As Tomaney (2000) describes, the Labour Party's traditional antipathy towards devolution had been largely replaced during the course of the 1980s and 1990s with a more positive stance, in part reflecting political expediency but also, to a degree, reflecting a genuine conversion in some sections of the party. Although the precise rationale for Labour's commitment in this respect remained somewhat ambiguous, it was clear that by the time of its election in 1997 it was firmly pledged to the devolution and regionalisation project, albeit in asymmetrical and somewhat unsystematic form. For business interests across Britain, then, the drive towards devolution and regionalisation was seen as inexorable, and business groups in turn adopted a more neutral political stance, accepting the reality of devolution and the relatively limited scale of the devolution and regionalisation proposals and that opposition was no longer politically expedient.
Within a strategic^relational framework, however, this situation can in turn be properly understood only in the context of previous eras of the devolution debate. At times, for example, business interests have been instrumental in questioning and opposing devolution and in effectively`watering down' devolution proposals. In Scotland, as Lynch (1998) shows, although business groups could not be presented as implacable opponents of devolution or as an effective`veto group' in this sphere, certain business interests were active in opposing the establishment of a Scottish Assembly in the 1970s and in the`No' campaign at the 1979 referendum. More recently, opinion polls in the first half of the 1990s registered an ongoing scepticism on the part of business over the devolution question, and business groups were influential in making taxation a significant issue both before and during the referendum campaign. In turn, public and private contact between business interests and government over this question meant that the proposed taxation powers of the Scottish Parliament were heavily circumscribed (Lynch, 1998, page 101) . In addition, the Labour government, together with other parties supporting constitutional change, sought during the referendum campaign to reassure the business community about the impacts of devolution and to establish detailed consultation processes with Scottish business organisations.
Elsewhere it would seem that the scepticism of business interests has had similar impacts. In Wales, business interests were largely opposed to devolution in 1979 and exerted significant pressure for increased business influence in the Assembly in the run up to the referendum in 1997. More generally, the Labour Party's gradual turn to devolution through the 1980s and 1990s occurred within the context of the party's broad attempt to cultivate support amongst the business community after the party's poor electoral performance in 1983. In general, then, the stance adopted by business groups has been a contributory factor in limiting the scope of the devolution and regionalisation process.
Despite the`reactive' character of business interests in the face of constitutional change, then, it would seem that business strategies and political manoeuvering have had some impact in limiting the scale of devolution. Notwithstanding this, however, it is also apparent that in recent times some business interests have been more supportive of the regional agenda. With regard to English regionalism, for example, Mawson (1997, pages 188^189) highlights business perceptions of the increasing salience of regional-level organisation in accessing European funding, in improving the coordination of government programmes, in increasing the transparency and accountability of government agencies, and in promoting economic development. In similar vein, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce argued to the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee in 1995 that a stronger regional voice was required if British regions were to be effectively represented in Europe (see Mawson, 1997, page 188) . At the same time, the CBI raised concerns over the coordination of regional policymaking and the transparency and accountability of government. Howard Davies, then Director General of the CBI, launched a regional business agenda initiative to consider``a growing consensus that a regional focus for decision-making across the public sector needed to be created which allowed input from the business community'' (Davies, 1995, (3) quoted in Mawson, 1997, page 189 ). There were, therefore, signs that business interests not only were beginning to engage with the growing regional agenda but also were laying the foundations for more direct attempts to influence the structure of the new institutions.
The structural constraints faced by business interests in the present devolutionary era thus in part reflect previous action by business groups. Although this has been only one factor within a much broader complex of political relations that have influenced the progress of the devolution issue it has nonetheless played a role in establishing the context for the current devolutionary process. Clearly, the progress of devolution has been critically influenced by other factors öincluding internal party political debate within the Labour Party, the emergence of regionalism across other European contexts, and the trajectory of public opinion in the light of economic decline in Scotland and Walesöbut the stance of organised business interests has been a significant influence in defining the character of the devolutionary arrangements.
In the event, devolution has been a highly asymmetrical project, within which Scotland and Wales have been granted executive powers in health, education and training, local government, economic development, social services, housing, transport, tourism, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, food, the environment, sport, heritage, and the arts, whereas the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) outside London are`lightyears behind the elected assemblies' as slimline bodies with mainly strategic functions (see Hazell, 2000, pages 3^5) . In Scotland, powers over the areas listed extend to the legislative arena, whereas Wales lacks primary legislative powers. Also, the Scottish Parliament has an additional tax-raising power to increase or decrease the basic rate of income tax by up to three pence in the pound. Yet in spite of the scale of the constitutional changes introduced, control over macroeconomic and regulatory policy, finance, and, in many cases, the overall framework for a wide range of social and economic policy remains firmly with central government.
In general, it is clear that business interests across Britain have recognised the limited scale and nature of the devolution proposals. Devolution and regionalisation have not been perceived as a challenge to the primacy of the national state. Even in Scotland, where the devolution of powers is substantially greater than elsewhere, the business community has not seen it as a radical change. As a representative of the Association of Scottish Chambers of Commerce commented, for example:`t he business community in the Chambers were marginally against devolution. I would describe it as agnostic. But there were a great bulk of them that didn't think it was going to be any worse or any better, just didn't think it was going to make any difference. I didn't join the Constitutional Convention.'' Similarly, a national representative at CBI headquarters in London argued that the changes in Scotland represented a change of degree rather than in kind:`S ome of the devolution is devolution in name, but it's been happening anyway because there was a degree of autonomy to Scottish policies. The Scottish Parliament gives an added dimension, because it means there is more work for us. We're just doing different things, rearranging the work and so on.'' Broadly similar sentiments were expressed in the more limited devolutionary context in Wales. In England, meanwhile, regionalisation is`not comparable' to devolution in Scotland and Wales (Hazell, 2000, page 5) . Even in London, where the Greater London Authority is elected, it retains only limited direct responsibilities in certain policy areas and has no revenue-raising power. Elsewhere, the RDAs represent a limited experiment in regionalisation and are wholly dependent on central government for their relatively modest budgets. Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that business interests and groups have tended to see regionalism in England as a limited project. As a representative of the CBI at the national level argued:`W hat's happening in the English regions is that there hasn't been enough regionalisation for any kind of consideration from the top. There is the enhanced role of the Regional Policy Advisor who sits here at [CBI] headquarters. This role is not just coordinating everything, it's doing more, it's actually going to the regions and helping members with regionally specific policy activities.'' As Adams et al (2002, pages 212^213) describe, regionalism in England remains heavily constrained by the central control over policy and resources established by the Labour government since 1997 and subsequently strengthened after the election in 2001. In particular, devolved institutions were never seen as part of the key strategymaking apparatus of government; rather, 10 Downing Street, the Cabinet Office, and the Treasury were conceived as the``three engines at the heart of government'' (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996 , page 240, quoted in Adams et al, 2002, page 212) . In turn, central government provides leadership and vision and stipulates national (English) standards, leaving only restricted`earned autonomy' for regional administrations.
Beyond the increasing inevitability and limited scale of devolution, a number of other issues have been prevalent in business perceptions. First, it is clear that business groups face diverse cultural contexts across the British territories that in turn have generally been paralleled in the existing institutional structure for business representation. In Scotland, for example, there are long-established Scottish subjectivities and identities built around what Nairn (2000) has identified as a`latent state' awaiting the return of political institutions to reawaken its national politics and identity. In turn, as Raco (2003) shows, although Scottish business representation has historically been dominated by a range of fragmented and competing agencies, Scotland-wide organisation has expanded since the 1960s. In particular, the role of UK-wide organisations and their regional branch offices have taken on a higher profile, with business agendas increasingly being articulated at a Scottish national level. CBI Scotland and the Institute of Directors (IoD) Scotland have been key organisations both as regional offices of their national bodies but also as autonomous regional actors, developing distinctively Scottish policy agendas. In addition, a wide variety of other business associations have had an established Scottish presence. Given this context, devolution has seen Scottish identities and awareness playing a bigger role in the organisation, agendas, and identities of business organisations, deriving new subjectivities that have gone hand in hand with a broader politicisation of the Scottish business community (see Raco, 2003) .
Wales has been less distinct in institutional terms and did not sustain``separate civic institutions which could underpin the idea of self-government'' (Bradbury, 1997, page 10).`Welshness' has thus been expressed predominantly through cultural characteristics such as language and religion. However, Wales retained a distinct political, administrative, and territorial identity that has been mirrored in the pattern of business representation. Although the business community has traditionally played à`v ery limited role in Welsh civic life'' (Morgan and Rees, 2001 , page 133), with limited engagement both on the part of the coalowners, who dominated employment in Wales historically, and the managers of branch plants, which contributed to the subsequent diversification of the Welsh economy, the main business organisations have long-established national offices in Wales. Though these groups have not formed a strongly developed organisational presence, and the Welsh Development Agency has come to play a prominent role``almost as a surrogate for business interests'' (Morgan and Rees, 2001 , page 134), they have nonetheless operated as peak organisations for the Welsh business community.
Business organisations in many English regions have not had a strong imagined community and associated institutional base around which to construct identities, frame problems, and mobilise action. Whereas the North East has traditionally had a stronger sense of regional identity than other English regions, and a long history of regional institution-building (Benneworth and Tomaney, 2002) , other English regions have lacked cultural and administrative distinctiveness. The South East and South West of England, in particular, are characterised by a lack of substantive coherence and strong subregional historical^cultural attachments (for further details, see Valler et al, 2004 ). This weakness is hardly less apparent in other regions such as the East Midlands and the East of England, where the comments of an IoD regional representative are typical:`I t doesn't make sense to talk about the East of England as a region ... . If you talk to people in Hertfordshire, they see themselves as London and the Home Counties; if you talk to people in Essex they'll tell you that they live in the southeast, if you talk to people in Norfolk and Suffolk, they'll tell you they see themselves as East Anglia ... . So it isn't a region that sits naturally, and you've not got either an historic region, or the North East or the North West which are well established regions. You've got a region which is a bit of a hotchpotch, and people don't have an identity.'' Elsewhere, the West Midlands, the North West, and Yorkshire and Humberside have somewhat stronger cultural bases, though this is always within the context of more localised identities, administrative complexities, and often fragmented institutional conditions. As a result, business representation at the regional level in most English regions has tended to face an historical^cultural context that has militated against the construction of business identities and subjectivities at that scale.
A second factor here concerns business perceptions of the likely responses of other interest groups to the new devolved arrangements. Certainly, many business groups across the UK territories recognised the potential challenges raised by other interests organising for influence within the new arrangements. This is reflected in Wales, as Morgan and Rees (2001) report, where the business community and predominantly the CBI campaigned forcefully for the inclusion of a statutory duty to consult with business in the 1998 Government of Wales Act, because of fears that the Assembly might seek to marginalise Welsh business interests. Here, business groups have clearly seen the necessity of establishing an effective presence in the face of competing interests, and lobbying around the Assembly has been seen as increasingly important. A representative of the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) in Wales argued, for example:`I t's the biggest growth industry in Cardiff I swear! _ But the biggest growth in terms of employment has been in all the campaigning organisations and the voluntary sector ... . They've taken on board the fact that they need to interact with the Assembly.'' Similar sentiments were expressed in interviews throughout the regions. However, it is also apparent that within the business sector itself individual business associations have had to compete to retain their position and influence within the business lobby. The fragmentation among and competitive nature of business associations are allied to distinct perceptions and motivations on the part of individual organisations and, in turn, these organisations face specific organisational pressures in responding to regionalisation. As a representative of the IoD in the East of England pointed out:`N ow with the advent of RDAs we decided that it was going to be necessary for the Institute to form regions so that we had a structure in place to mirror the RDA boards themselves. Many other organisations have done similar operations _ it's not a question of whether you want to be there or don't want to be öwe need to be there, we've got to be there ... . There was certain internal opposition to the idea of regions mainly because the individual branches within those regions wanted to try and maintain their own identity.'' Lastly, business groups perceived the need for a pragmatic response in the face of inevitable change. As devolution became a reality, the perception on the part of business interests throughout the territories was that their interests would be best served by good and effective relations with the new governance institutions. Although many business organisations remained unconvinced by the claimed advantages of devolution and regionalisation, and many harboured private concerns about the nature of the various arrangements, the overwhelming sentiment was that business groups should accept the reality of democratically mandated constitutional change. Indeed, in many ways it is difficult to see how individual organisations representing business could have acted differently, given their particular responsibilities in effectively representing the views of their members in government. With regard to the North East, for example, Benneworth and Tomaney (2002) highlight the lack of any significant dissension around the new regional structures on the part of strong vested interests in the region. As they suggest (2002, page 140) ,``the fact that this did not occur, in part, reflects the desire of the main regional actors to guard their reputation (real or otherwise) for co-operative working.'' Similarly, Lynch (1998, page 94) argues that in Scotland:`T he CBI was in a difficult position similar to other Scottish BIAs: adopting a highprofile and quasi-partisan stance against devolution was not clever politics when Labour was likely to win the election and establish a Scottish Parliament. [An] oppositional stance _ could have wrecked the CBI's prospects of a constructive relationship with the incoming government and the new parliament.'' In summary, then, business perceptions have registered not only the increasing inevitability of devolution under the Labour government but also the limited scale and nature of the proposals as they have developed in practice. In addition, individual business interests and organisations have recognised other significant factors: the diversity of cultural and institutional contexts across Britain, the likely actions of other interest groups (including other business interests), and the practical necessity of a pragmatic response to state restructuring. Yet beyond the historical evolution of the British state and the developing perceptions of business interests, the nature of organisational change is also influenced by the respective capacities of business interests and actors and the processes through which their strategies are formulated and advanced. In addition, over time, further developments will also be influenced by associated processes of monitoring, adjustment, and learning. In the next section we therefore offer some initial insights around these themes.
4 Implementing change First, in terms of the capacities of business interest groups, it is clear that business interest representation at the regional scale in Britain has historically been underdeveloped. Other than the CBI, which has a set of regional branches, business organisations tend to be either locally rooted, as in the case of chambers of commerce, or organised predominantly on a national scale, such as the various umbrella bodies and trade associations (Bennett, 1998; Coulson, 1999) . As we discussed in section 2, the system of business representation in Britain has been overwhelmingly centralised. However, within this limited regional context, the nation-regions (Scotland and Wales) have had rather more developed institutional frameworks for business representation than have the English regions, given their particular administrative and cultural contexts. As we have suggested, in different ways and at different levels the nations have established institutional and cultural identities that have formed the basis for business organisation, and business representation has tended to parallel the varying contexts with relatively long-established`national' offices of the main business organisations or, at a minimum, with experience of operating at the nation-region level. In turn, this has provided a stronger institutional foundation for business responses to devolution. This should be seen, however, within the context of a limited institutional framework for business representation in the British regions as a whole. In England, only the CBI has had an established network of regional branches, but these have generally been very limited operations with a staff of around three or four people, compared with several hundred at CBI headquarters (Centrepoint). In many respects, the character of CBI regional offices across Britain has been set by the dominant centralised nature of the organisation. Although the level of resources, activity, and visibility are relatively higher in Scotland and Wales, the key resources, legitimacy, identity, and policymaking capacity of the CBI derive overwhelmingly from Centrepoint in London. Even in these territories the CBI is heavily dependent on the national organisation for policy and logistical support. Beyond this, in terms of the leading comprehensive business organisations, the IoD, Chambers of Commerce, and the FSB have traditionally had little or no significant operation at the regional scale in England and only small regional offices or loose umbrella arrangements in the nation-regions. Second, with regard to processes of strategy making and implementation it is clear that, in light of the perceptions of business interests of the current devolutionary and regionalisation processes and the limited capacities that business interests have in the regions, the organisational strategy adopted has generally been one of relatively modest institutional change. Business interests have sought to position themselves to play their part in the new governance structures, maintain influence as other groups manoeuver in the revised arrangements, situate themselves appropriately to cover possible further developments, and build influence at the operational level. The processes through which this strategy has evolved have varied across organisations, though in most cases the lead has been given by the relevant national offices. The CBI nationally, for example, has seen devolution as requiring a reorganisation of its activities and some increase in the resources provided by Centrepoint to its regional offices rather than any expansion in the number of its regional policy officers. Some insights into the thinking of the CBI centrally were set out by a CBI representative:`I don't think the fact that other organisations are appointing regional policy officers in each region is really going to make any difference to us _ it's all about priorities and how you organise your time. A lot of the regional stuff is still about policy at the centre of governmentöOK, it's changing, it's actually resolving itself in different ways in different regions. But also you might question the basis of the regions ... . So we have thought about all those kinds of issues and we have decided at the moment that appointing more regional officers is not something that needs to be done because the balance of work between the centre and the regional offices is probably sufficient.'' The national headquarters of the IoD was also key to the establishment of a network of small regional offices in response to the devolutionary^regional agenda. Policymaking activity remains dominated by the IoD's central policy unit based in London, though within this framework the regional offices have a substantial degree of autonomy in engaging with regional bodies. In turn, some of the regional offices are establishing a more concerted regional presence and a higher level of activity, with more positive contributions to policy formulation and in some cases a developing role in strategy making, although other IoD offices are more low-key or peripheral in policy terms. However, the regional offices as a whole are generally very limited in terms of personnel and resources and in some cases are reliant on wholly voluntary individual efforts. Lobbying activity has increased postdevolution, marking something of a departure from the IoD's traditional role as a source of local business contacts and networks. In addition, the IoD and its members have at times played significant roles in particular territories, for example in instigating moves towards the formation of the influential Group of 5 in Scotland (see Valler et al, 2004) and providing the chairperson of Business Wales. However, in many respects, the IoD continues to emphasise relatively informal networks and modes of operation.
The FSB established a network of area policy units throughout Britain, in the period 1999^2000, to reflect the regional agenda. The new units each have a policy development officer to work purely on regional policy matters. In many ways, this development reflects an emerging policy orientation to the FSB's activity. In the past, the FSB regarded itself primarily as a member services organisation, providing a range of benefits, advice, and services to small firms through an established branch network. However, in more recent years the FSB at the UK scale has begun to engage in policymaking activity more directly, conducting a large-scale survey of its members in 1999, entitled``Barriers to Growth'', and beginning to establish a national policy agenda on behalf of small businesses. As part of this policy work the FSB nationally launched the move to establish some policy capacity at the regional scale in light of the new governance framework. In turn, the FSB regional offices each contributed their own sections to Barriers to Growth and in some cases are currently developing regional policy manifestos to input into debates in their respective regions.
The structure of chambers of commerce at the regional scale is extremely varied and has been subject to considerable change in light of the growing regional agenda, thè`B ennett report'' (Bennett, 1991) on chamber restructuring (which called for the rationalisation of chamber organisation, the strengthening of service provision, and the exchange of best practice), and the increasing salience of EU policy, which has sought to engage business and develop regional institutional capacity through its structural funds. However, developments here have perhaps been rather more regionally autonomous than in the other comprehensive business associations, and in turn the picture is somewhat more unevenly developed. In the North East of England, for example, a formal amalgamation of the three main subregional chambers in 1995 created the North East Chambers of Commerce, with a membership of 5000 businesses and around 250 employees, whereas in some English regions chamber organisation remains embryonic or even negligible.
Beyond these internal institutional changes, which have been predominantly driven from the`top-down', in Scotland, Wales, and six of the nine English regions umbrella groups have emerged from the`bottom-up' to coordinate representational activities (see table 1 ). These groups have evolved with a view towards establishing better communication between business associations and a degree of consistency in business responses and, in turn, seek to prevent the appearance of regional business communities as divided, weak, or fragmented. Yet it is clear throughout that individual business associations retain their own autonomy and continue to develop independent positions and policies. Also, partnerships are not necessarily strong or unified and, often, existing subregional tendencies and institutional tensions remain apparent. The groups have not, therefore, established or pursued unified and singular business agendas and in the main do not drive strategy formation or strategic input. Rather, they tend to reflect a perception on the part of business interests that some form of regional coordination is essential to operate effectively in the new devolved^regional context and to respond to the increased and changing demands made on business interests. At times this is reinforced by external pressures, such as in Wales, where former First Minister Alyn Michael stressed the need for a unified business voice, or in some English regions, where RDAs have argued for a degree of coordination.
In this context the regional partnerships tend to operate as relatively informal groupings with quite limited resources and predominantly a quiet`backroom' style, but they are becoming increasingly important in terms of regional business identities and with regard to their lobbying and advisory roles. In the North East and North West of England the groups are longer established, though in other English regions new partnerships have often developed from earlier groups formulated in the mid to late 1990s to prepare for the`incoming' RDAs. To a degree, the activities and functions reflect the respective maturity and scale of the groups, but they are becoming key consultation mechanisms for governance bodies in the regions. In turn, given the increasing demands placed on business associations generally, the partnerships operate an informal division of labour, allocating specific aspects of their activity to appropriate member organisations. Also, there are signs in some regions of more direct links developing between governance bodies and business partnerships, as officers from RDAs and government offices attend partnership meetings and as partnerships disseminate information about regional policy down to member groups. Lastly in terms of monitoring, adjustment, and learning, we would note that the devolution and regionalisation project is still in its early stages, and the full implications of devolved governance and its likely future trajectories remain unclear. Consequently, the organisational responses implemented by the various business interests are also very recent and have had little time to`bed down'. To date, therefore, business interests have largely kept a watching brief over the new arrangements and the course of the devolution project, and there have been no clear signs of further organisational adjustments. However, in light of early experience, we can say that business interests have expressed a variety of positive and negative views on the structure and performance of the new arrangements. In some cases, for example, business respondents have noted, and appreciated, the new points of access that have emerged under the devolved arrangements, such as contacts with new committees, assembly members, and policy processes that have opened greater and more diverse opportunities for business engagement. This is often reinforced by`proximity benefits' such as the political`village' atmosphere often reported by respondents in Wales and Scotland, in contrast to the remoteness of Westminster and Whitehall. However, many business interests and organisations across the British territories have been more critical, with significant concerns over the nature and scale of business representation, the limits of business involvement in policymaking, and a perceived lack of impact on policy outcomes.
In the specific case of Wales, Morgan and Rees (2001) have described serious problems with the operation of the Business Partnership (BP) established by the Assembly as a formal consultative council to meet the requirements of Section 115 of the 1998 Government of Wales Act, which provides a statutory basis for business input into the Assembly. The reaction of members of Business Wales, the partnership organisation established in response to devolution, to the efficacy of the BP has been somewhat mixed, with many representatives evidently concerned with the BP's ability to get things done. These concerns may in part be traceable to difficulties that business leaders have had in adjusting to the new realities and culture of democratic devolution. For example, some commentators detail the complaints of Business Wales representatives with regard to the BP being``too big, too stage-managed and too public'' (Morgan and Rees, 2001, page 148) . By the time the BP Council came to reflect on its own performance at its fourth meeting, on 1 December 2000, representatives argued that the council should serve as a means for securing business input into the Assembly rather than simply cascading information downwards. Despite attempts on the part of the Assembly to placate business concerns, considerable anxiety remains on the part of business interests that the BP should augment its role as a forum for debate by taking concrete action to translate business views into policy impacts.
Beyond these concerns it is clear that business interests are facing new demands that pose significant challenges to their institutional capacities, their cultures, and their modes of operation. Increasingly, business interests and groups are required under the new arrangements to establish positive agendas across an ever-wider range of policy spheres, to coordinate with other business groups, and to demonstrate a sensitivity to other stakeholders. In addition, business interests have to ally a focus on`outputs' and results' with a concern for the political sensibilities of process. These new demands question the capacity of business interests to respond effectively, particularly given the limited resources of business organisations at the regional scale, the diffuse and fragmented institutional form of business interests, and the long-established ways of working that characterise subnational business politics. However, as we have suggested, the issues noted here have not as yet been registered directly in the organisational strategies of business associations, though there have periodically been signs of tension in relationships between business groups and the new governance institutions.
Conclusions
To date, changes in the pattern of business representation consequent upon devolution and regionalisation in Britain suggest a reconfiguration of business political activity rather than a step change in the institutional foundation for subnational business interest representation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the overall scale, operation, and degree of formalisation of the new business political arrangements tend broadly to reflect the established institutional and political contexts of the respective nations and regions and the level of devolution ceded to the territories. Clearly, however, key macroeconomic, regulatory, and policy decisions remain firmly in the control of central government, and the early evidence suggests that business politics in Britain is similarly marked by an ongoing centralism.
In our view, an SRA provides important insights, illuminating this process of change. From this viewpoint, the responses adopted by business interests were not inscribed in the structure of capitalism or of the state but reflected particular choices based on their specific readings of the nature and trajectory of the devolution project, their own relatively limited capacities, and the likely actions of other interests. The process of devolution and the particular representational regime advanced by the Labour government have been perceived by business interests and organisations as structural changes within which they act to formulate strategy and implement change. In examining the nature of these responses we are aware of the variety of business interests and organisations, yet in this instance we have seen quite a high degree of commonality across various interest groups. The reasons for these choices reflect the strong path dependency that has characterised business representation in Britain and a clear perception that the current devolutionary process did not represent a significant challenge to the primacy of the central state. In this sense, the ongoing centralism of business politics in Britain is`strategically selected for', and the response of business interests has tended to register the established reactive and pragmatic nature of business politics in Britain.
In proposing an SRA here we do not seek a wholesale rejection of previous theoretical and empirical insights regarding subnational business politics founded in more structuralist or more agency-oriented frameworks. There can be little doubt, for example, of the crucial importance of changing state strategies and representational regimes in recasting patterns of business interest representation in Britain over the past twenty-five years. In addition, we would not seek to deny the very real pressures exerted by issues of membership, influence, and organisation, which clearly do impact on the various political and organisational calculations of business associations. However, in our view, these alternative approaches are characterised by important theoretical lacunae that effectively limit their explanatory power. From the more structuralist standpoint, for example, it is difficult to account for the specific responses of individual business interests and actors to a restructured context for business interest representation. How are we to explain, for instance, why some business interests and individuals have been effectively mobilised at certain times and places whereas others in broadly similar material circumstances remain disengaged? Approaching this type of question is clearly central in explaining outcomes, which arise as a result of the strategies that actors select in light of a perceived structural context. In contrast, the more agency-centred explanations have substantially underplayed the crucial interrelationship between state strategies and the politics of business interest representation, in favour of a focus on the internal decisionmaking and preferences of individual business associations. Here, we might question, for example, the capacity of such an approach to explain the impact of Thatcherite and New Labour representational strategies on the strategic responses of the CBI. In addition, the rational-choice-based frameworks that have predominated here have posited a series of fixed`logics' determined by the material circumstances of business associations when, in our view, business subjectivities are far more complex and where, for example,``different actors in similar material circumstances (exposed perhaps to different influences and experiences) will construct their interests and preferences differently'' (Hay, 2002, page 131) .
In contrast to these frameworks we seek a more balanced explanatory account that does not privilege structure or agency but recognises the`organic' relationship between action and context. This does not deny such structural and agency factors as those outlined above but rather sets out to establish the extent to which, and the ways in which, these and other factors have influenced the selection and deployment of strategies`on the ground'. In this way we hope to build on and extend many of the existing theoretical and empirical contributions in the field by offering a more nuanced and integrative theoretical approach. Here, the SRA suggests some significant theoretical and empirical departures. In particular, a less abstract focus on political strategy points towards a more sophisticated conception of change that is sensitive to the multidimensional nature of causality and thus integrating economic, political, and ideational features of political, change yet also sensitive to levels and degrees of change, questions of timing, and path dependency (see Marsh et al, 1999) . This can help in transcending the structure^agency dichotomy that has been a crucial underlying feature of debates around business interest representation. In addition, a further advantage of the SRA in this sphere is the direct engagement with the realities and complexities of political strategy. This suggests much closer attention to questions of business perceptions, personality, and political manoeuvering in the analysis of business politics and in turn points towards a deeper interrogation of strategic activity through, for example, discourse-analytic techniques and a much closer attention to the ethnograpy of business actors and organisations. In this paper we have focused particularly on the nature of business perceptions, which have been largely absent from previous accounts of business interest representation, in order to demonstrate the complex foundations upon which the strategic responses of various business groups have been constructed. There is no doubt that such an approach could be extended through more systematic and rigorous analytical techniques. However, in more general terms, we would argue that the whole sphere of business perceptions, personality, and political manoeuvering have been substantially underplayed in the literature to date and would provide interesting and lively new avenues for research.
